The complexity indicated in the title of this paper does not refer purely to the internal structure of the prohibition of torture, but also to the obligations of States party to the ECHR that are tied to this prohibition. This is because it is not restricted to negative obligations understood as a duty on the part of the State to abstain from certain interferences by the public authorities and which was the fundamental purpose of the ECHR and as such was entered explicit into the normative structure of the freedoms and rights defined in the ECHR , but embraces -firstly -positive obligations which result in a command to take measures for the purpose of ensuring freedom from the said torture for persons under the jurisdiction of States that are party to the ECHR, both in horizontal and vertical relations, and -secondly -a procedural obligations which, year by year, is achieving an ever more autonomous position among the types of commitment resulting from the ECHR for States and the essence of which is the effective clarification of circumstances in the violation of the prohibition of torture. Keywords: Human Rights. Torture. Ill-treatment. Positive and negative obligations.
Introduction
One of the most important instruments via which the Council of Europe (hereinafter: CoE) carries out its statutory goals of protecting human rights and the rule of law 1 is the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, usually referred to as the European Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter: ECHR). This was the CoE's first multilateral treaty and at the same time the only one of many CoE treaties where a mechanism was anticipated for investigating inter-state issues or individual complaints (Drzemczewski, 2001 , pp. 158-163).
It is a well-known fact that the catalogue of human rights and freedoms defined in the ECHR has essentially been limited to selected personal human rights and fundamental political freedoms, while those rights for which regulation aroused the greatest reservations, in other words the right to property, education and free elections, 2 were transferred to the supplementary Protocol 1. 3 The initiators of the ECHR focused on those human rights considered as significant elements of the foundations of European democracies. The prohibition of torture has a special place among them, and is defined by Article 3 of the ECHR, stating that "No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment."
1. Since 1998, Article 3 of the ECHR has borne the title Prohibition of torture. 4 Specific conduct, acknowledged as that demanding the fullest condemnation and stigmatisation was thus highlighted, thereby fully reflecting the intentions of the conceivers (the authors) of the Convention.
However, in the light of the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter: ECtHR) and beforehand also of the European Commission of Human Rights (hereinafter: EComHR), going beyond an individual approach and distinguishing between three forms (guises) of prohibited treatment or punishment is justified, on the grounds of Article 3 of the ECHR.
5 Namely, at a certain point the ECHR's bodies separated torture from inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, thereby achieving a certain kind of gradation in the forms of treatment or punishment prohibited by Article 3 of the ECHR: from the cruellest and most disgraceful to a milder form, not causing pain and suffering so much as a sense of fear and humiliation. At the same time they introduced the term ill-treatment 6 to the case-law as a term referring to these three forms of prohibited treatment or punishment. It was added to the ECHR text on the strength of protocol 11, which entered into force on 01 November 1998. 5 However, this contradistinction is not an essential condition for an application to be accepted; besides, applicants frequently word their allegations of the violation of Art. 3 ECHR without indicating a specific form of ill-treatment. This is frequently so in cases related to deportation or extradition -see, inter alia, Ahmed v. Austria debase the victim is a further factor to be taken into account . . . but the absence of any such purpose cannot conclusively rule out a finding of a violation of Article 3." 26 As such, in the case of degrading treatment an intention to debase or humiliate the victim is not an essential condition. After all, it is not about the goal the perpetrator was guided by, but the consequence that was or could have been evoked by his action in the victim and other persons. 27 All the more so since in many cases "breaking the physical or moral resistance" 28 of the victim, or inclining this person to act against their will or conscience, 29 may be the immediate purpose. The purposes defined above are described in literature dealing with this subject-matter as "prohibited purposes". However, what is significant here is that the Court -unlike in the case of the UN's Convention against Torture -included such purposes not in the definition of torture, but in the definition of degrading treatment, which it has confirmed its relatively more recent cases.
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Admitting the subjective feeling of being degraded and humiliated on the one hand while simultaneously abandoning the express requirement for there to be an intention of such treatment on the part of the authorities has significant consequences for the scope of positive obligations for ensuring the conditions for enjoying freedom from degrading treatment while in detention. 31 This is because the case-law shows that it is possible to determine that the conditions of a person's detention violate the prohibition of degrading treatment even when it has been clearly found that the authorities had no such intention -no such "positive intention". Having regard to the severity of the ill-treatment suffered by Abdüllatif İlhan and the surrounding circumstances, including the significant lapse in time before he received proper medical attention, the Court finds that he was a victim of very serious and cruel suffering that may be characterised as torture. . . 40 In other words, it is "irrelevant for the purposes of Article 3". 41 The absoluteness indicated in Article 3 of the ECHR has a general dimension, since the ECHR does anticipate any purposes whatsoever that could justify the violation of this article. This applies even to such purposes that have social legitimacy, such as national security, public security, or the economic wellbeing of the country, order and the prevention of crime, health and morality.
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This is where the difference lies between the prohibition in Article 3 of the ECHR and the rights guaranteed in Articles 8 to 11 of the ECHR. In regard to the latter, they are rights for which socially recognised goals are a condition for them to be exercised.
43
This character of the prohibition of ill-treatment has been strengthened by the prohibition of taking measures for the derogation of commitments resulting from Article 3 of the ECHR, even in the case of war or other public danger threatening the life of the nation. 44 Bearing this in mind, Joaçaba The criterion of exceeding the level of suffering or humiliation unavoidable in a specific situation is a central element of the Court's assessment. Suffering inflicted on a victim may involve the infliction of physical or mental suffering. 53 The assessment of whether the minimum was exceeded is relative, and depends on numerous factors. Some of them are subjective in character, others objective, but they always refer to the specific case in question. Because of this, in certain circumstances the fact of the minimum threshold being exceeded may, on its own, prove insufficient.
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Therefore, when analysing the actual state of a specific case in detail, the Court takes into account such circumstances as duration of the ill-treatment, its physical and mental consequences, and -in certain cases -the sex, age and state of health of the victim. 55 The Court also takes the nature and context of the treatment into consideration. 56 The above circumstances are taken into account when assessing any of the forms of ill-treatment.
7. Bearing in mind this special nature of human good, the protection of which is addressed by freedom from ill-treatment, it should come as no surprise that among those entitled to exercise this freedom indicated by the ECtHR there is a certain group of people who should be covered by special protection pursuant to Article 3 of the ECHR. These are persons to whom the Court has granted the status of vulnerable individuals, in this case vulnerable to ill-treatment. The protection of people in this category -as a general rule of the obligation to protect connected to ill-treatment. 59 The protection of an individual's physical and psychological integrity is therefore the connecting element in this case. 60 What is characteristic here is that the Court does not define exactly who falls within this category of people, only explicitly indicating children. 61 As noted perceptively by Dröge (2003) , where children are concerned . . . there is a constantly raised need for protection, since children may be harmed in their development and sense of personal dignity to a particular degree and for a particularly long time. . . . Because of this, the scope of positive obligations here will systematically be slightly greater than in relation to persons of age (p. 324). 62 The open nature of the catalogue of vulnerable individuals does not seem accidental either.
In seeking a common denominator for children and other particularly vulnerable persons, one may presume that the Court has in mind those who, for various reasons, are unable to freely take decisions as most people can. Therefore people are not vulnerable individuals purely because they tend in general to be in a weaker social position, but the weakness of their position, and as such their absence of autonomy, must be the result of a particular relationship of dependence (Dröge, 2003, p. 324 ).
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In addition, whereas in the case of a certain group of vulnerable individuals this relationship of dependence is not so much of a permanent character as one that may endure for longer (children and women as victims of domestic violence, 64 persons with disabilities or suffering from mental illnesses, 65 asylum-seekers, 66 the Roma minority, 67 inhabitants of villages situated in the south-eastern reaches of Turkey during the conflict with PPK guerrillas), 68 in the majority of cases it is rather of a short-term and transitional character. Because of this the bodies of the ECHR intro-Joaçaba, v. 17, n. 3, p. 767-778, set./dez. 2016 EJJL duced the term 'persons in a vulnerable position' into the case-law, 69 simultaneously emphasising that the authorities are bound by the obligation to protect people in such a situation. 70 Analysis of the case-law demonstrates that those recognised by the ECtHR as people in such a specific situation are predominantly people in detention 71 The preceding remarks constitute a reference to the doctrine of positive obligations that is being rapidly expanded by ECHR bodies. In regard to the prohibition in question, the bodies of the ECHR put a very strong emphasis in their normative justification on the connection that Article 3 of the ECHR has with Article 1 of the ECHR, on the general obligation to respect commitments resulting for States party to the ECHR. Thanks to this, as described by F. Sudre inhérence tous azimuts, positive obligations came to be inseparably connected to the prohibition of torture, and are universally applied (Sudre, 1995, p. 368) , while States party to the ECHR expressed their consent to be bound by them at the moment of ratification of the European Convention. 75 Joaçaba, v. 17, n. 3, p. 767-778, set./dez. 2016 EJJL red explicite into the normative structure of the freedoms and rights defined in the ECHR, 78 but embraces -firstly -positive obligations which result in a command to take measures for the purpose of ensuring freedom from the said torture for persons under the jurisdiction of States that are party to the ECHR, both in horizontal and vertical relations, and -secondly -a procedural obligations which, year by year, is achieving an ever more autonomous position among the types of commitment resulting from the ECHR for States 79 and the essence of which is the effective clarification of circumstances in the violation of the prohibition of torture (Article 3 of the ECHR).
The scope of these obligations for States party to the ECHR determined by the ECHR's bodies fully confirms the fundamental nature of the freedoms protected by Article 3 of the ECHR. 80 
